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A Appendix
A.1 Theoretical Model
A.1.1 A simple version of Person-Tabellini’s PBC
In this section we describe a simple version of the model of electoral cycles with seignorage
developed by Persson & Tabellini (2000)2. We consider an economy with two main actors:
a government (or an incumbent politician) and voters (who also play the role of consumers).
Let us write the government budget constraint as
gt = ηt(τ¯ y + st) (A.1)
where gt is the government expenditure in period t, τ¯ is the fixed percentage rate of taxes, y
is the average income, st denotes “seignorage” or, more generally, a hidden and distorting tax
observed and paid for by the voters only after the elections, and ηt represents the incumbent’s
competence level (ability to handle the economy, for example, increase government expenditure
using the given tax revenue). Voters’ welfare in period t, denoted by wt, is given by
wt = y(1− τ¯)− st − V (st) + λgt (A.2)
where V (.) is a function capturing the distortions of seignorage3, so that V (0) = 0, V ′(.) > 0
for st > 0 and V
′′(.) > 0, and λ ≥ 1 is an exogenous parameter. To simplify the analysis, the
voters’ marginal utility from public consumption is assumed to be constant (that is, voters
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2are risk-neutral). As is common in these models, competence is a moving average process of
order 14, determined by
ηt = ϑt + ϑt−1 (A.3)
where ϑt is drawn from a continuous uniform distribution with support that covers [1−
1
2ϕ , 1+
1
2ϕ ] and is serially uncorrelated. Thus, its mean value is equal to 1 and its probability density
is equal to ϕ. Notice that ϕ represents the sensitivity of re-election probability to the level of
the incumbent’s competence, which is assumed to be constant over time. We further assume
that policy decisions in each period t are made before knowing the realization of ϑt and that
the realization of ϑt−1 is known to everyone.
The incumbent politician maximizes voter’s welfare and some exogenous “ego rents” R > 0
according to
E(wt|ϑt−1) + ptR (A.4)
where pt is the probability that the incumbent is re-elected. For simplicity, we set R equal to
1. The sequence of the stage game at time t is as follows: (1) the politician chooses st, given
ϑt−1 and without observing ϑt; (2) nature determines ϑt; (3) voters observe gt only; (4) if t is
an on-election period, voters re-elect the incumbent politician or elect a new contender drawn
from the same distribution; if t is an off-election period, we move to the election period. The
stage game is infinitely repeated.
Under these assumptions, the equilibrium in off-election periods is straightforward, as the
incumbent maximizes voters’ welfare only. Even though the quantity of seignorage in the
current period t reveals incumbent’s ϑt, the voters disregard it, as elections take place only in
period t+ 1. At that point, voters will look ahead to period t+ 2. By (A.3),
E(ηt+2|gt+1) = E(ϑt+2|gt+1) +E(ϑt+1|gt+1) = 1 + ϑt+1 (A.5)
Hence knowledge of ϑt in period t is irrelevant for the voters and the incumbent politician sets
st at the socially optimal level. More formally, the incumbent politician maximizes E(wt|ϑt−1),
which, after substituting (A.1) and (A.3) into (A.2), can be written as
E(wt|ϑt−1) = y(1− τ¯)− st − V (st) + λ(1 + ϑt−1)(τ¯ y + st) (A.6)
Solving the FOC for st, we get
−1− V ′(st) + λ(1 + ϑt−1) = 0 or
V ′(st) = λ(1 + ϑt−1)− 1 (A.7)
In on-election periods, on the other hand, the situation is different. When period t+ 1
arrives, the value of ϑt+1 is not irrelevant for the voters, as shown by (A.5). Even though
voters do not directly observe ϑt+1, they can infer it from gt+1 and beliefs about the level of
seignorage. We denote the voters’ guesses about ϑt+1 and st+1 as ϑ˜t+1 and s˜t+1 respectively.
From the budget constraint, we have
gt+1 = (ϑ˜t+1 + ϑt)(τ¯ y + s˜t+1) or
ϑ˜t+1 =
gt+1
τ¯ y + s˜t+1
− ϑt (A.8)
4Thus, competence changes over time, but slowly: if a policymaker was competent yesterday, he retains
some of his competence today, though some may depend on new factors. The MA(1) specification is also
convenient because it does not allow competence to carry over for more than two periods, that is, if after the
election the challenger replaces the incumbent.
3Inserting equation (A.1) (one period ahead) into the numerator of the first term on the right-
hand side of (A.8) gives
ϑ˜t+1 =
τ¯ y + st+1
τ¯ y + s˜t+1
(ϑt+1 + ϑt)− ϑt (A.9)
The voters’ behavior is then simple to explain: the incumbent is reappointed only if ϑ˜t+1
exceeds his opponent’s expected competence:
p˜t+1 =
{
1 iff ϑ˜t+1 ≥ 1
0 otherwise
(A.10)
As the incumbent politician does not yet know his own competence, his probability of re-
election, as perceived in period t + 1 when choosing the level of seignorage, is given by
pt+1 = Pr(p˜t+1 = 1) = Pr(ϑ˜t+1 ≥ 1). Using equation (A.9) we can write this probabil-
ity as
Pr
(
τ¯ y + st+1
τ¯ y + s˜t+1
(ϑt+1 + ϑt)− ϑt ≥ 1
)
or
Pr
(
ϑt+1 ≥
τ¯ y + s˜t+1
τ¯ y + st+1
− ϑt
st+1 − s˜t+1
τ¯ y + st+1
)
(A.11)
which can be calculated using the cumulative distribution function of ϑt+1
5. That is,
Pr
(
ϑt+1 ≥
τ¯ y + s˜t+1
τ¯ y + st+1
− ϑt
st+1 − s˜t+1
τ¯ y + st+1
)
=
1
2
+ ϕ
(
1−
τ¯ y + s˜t+1
τ¯ y + st+1
+ ϑt
st+1 − s˜t+1
τ¯ y + st+1
)
=
1
2
+ ϕ
(
st+1 − s˜t+1
τ¯ y + st+1
− ϑt
s˜t+1 − st+1
τ¯ y + st+1
)
= pt+1 (A.12)
By substituting equation (A.12) into equation (A.4) (one period ahead), we get the incum-
bent’s maximization problem in period t+ 1
E(wt+1|ϑt) + pt+1 = y(1− τ¯)− st+1 − V (st+1) + λ(1 + ϑt)(τ¯ y + st+1) + pt+1 (A.13)
where pt+1 is defined by equation (A.12). Solving the FOC for st+1, we get
−1− V ′(st+1) + λ(1 + ϑt) + ϕ(1 + ϑt)
τ¯ y + s˜t+1
(τ¯ y + st+1)2
= 0 (A.14)
In equilibrium, politicians’ choice of seignorage must be consistent with the voters’ guesses
(conjectures): st+1 = s˜t+1. This gives us
V ′(st+1) = λ(1 + ϑt)− 1 + ϕ
1 + ϑt
τ¯ y + st+1
(A.15)
Comparing equations (A.15) and (A.7), we see that incumbents choose higher levels of dis-
tortions (hence higher levels of seignorage) during elections periods, as the last term on the
right hand side of equation (A.15) is non-negative. This yields the central result of the model:
the government’s budget balance is influenced by the timing of elections, and hence PBCs are
expected to appear in all election periods and in all countries that have elections.
5Recall that ϑt+1 is drawn from a uniform distribution with mean 1 and density ϕ and hence ∀x
Pr(ϑt+1 ≥ x) = 1− Pr(ϑt+1 ≤ x) = 1
2
+ ϕ(1− x)
4A.1.2 Non-economic voting and competitiveness
A strong assumption of the above model is that the sensitivity of re-election probability to
the level of competence is considered to be the same in all periods. This assumption may be
satisfied when neither the government nor the voters can observe how this sensitivity parame-
ter varies over time; that is, when there is no access to free media or when the available media
do not deliver any information about voters’ attitudes and voting intentions. In the opposite
case, the observable value of this sensitivity parameter can reshape politicians’ incentives in
election years and affect the size of distortions identified in the above model. To see this, let
us assume that the re-election-to-competence sensitivity in period t, denoted now by ϕt, is
given by
ϕt = Ωt(1− Σt) + vt (A.16)
where vt is an i.i.d. error term with mean equal to 0, Σt is the level of non-economic voting
in period t, such that 0 ≤ Σt < 1, and Ωt is the level of competitiveness in period t, such
that Ωt > 0 and E(Ωt) = ϕ. Equation (A.16) suggests that the higher the weight voters
assign to non-economic issues and the lower the level of competitiveness, the less sensitive is
the probability of re-election to marginal changes in the incumbent’s competence level. We
further assume that the realizations of Σt and Ωt are known to everyone (policymakers and
voters) in period t (due to full access to free media that deliver such information via the
publication of opinion polls) and that policy decisions in period t are made after observing
Σt and Ωt. Under these assumptions ϑt is now drawn from a continuous uniform distribution
with mean 1 and density ϕ¯t defined as
ϕ¯t = E(ϕt|Σt,Ωt) = Ωt(1− Σt) (A.17)
and hence the equilibrium seignorage in on-election periods is now given by
V ′(st+1) = λ(1 + ϑt)− 1 + Ωt(1− Σt)
1 + ϑt
τ¯ y + st+1
(A.18)
Notice that when we consider the special case in which the evaluation of government perfor-
mance depends only on economic issues and the level of competitiveness is equal to its expected
value (that is, when we impose the restrictions that Σt = 0 and Ωt = ϕ), the conditional ex-
pectation in (A.17) becomes equal to ϕ and the equilibrium seignorage in on-election years is
the same as the one defined in (A.15). On the other hand, once we relax these restrictions,
we can see from the last term on the right hand side of equation (A.18) that the seignorage
distortion costs that politicians are willing to pay in equilibrium (and hence the incentives to
manipulate fiscal policy), V ′(st+1), are a negative function of the level of non-economic voting
Σt and a positive function of the level of competitiveness Ωt. As V
′(.) > 0, this also implies
that ∂st+1
∂Σt
< 0 and ∂st+1
∂Ωt
> 0. Intuitively, the larger the level of non-economic voting, the
weaker are politicians’ incentives to increase government expenditure in order to enhance their
chance of re-election, as fewer voters can be influenced by an electoral expenditure boom. As
a result, the equilibrium level of seignorage decreases in election years. On the other hand,
a higher level of competitiveness has the opposite effect, as the electoral outcome becomes
more sensitive to marginal changes in votes, which results in a higher level of equilibrium
seignorage in election years. Notice also that, if the level of non-economic voting is close to
1 (that is, voters do not care about economic issues when casting their votes) or the level
of competitiveness is close to 0 (that is, the government is certain of losing or winning the
elections), the equilibrium levels of seignorage in on-election and off-election periods will be
about the same, as the last term on the right hand side of (A.18) is close to zero. Therefore,
the central result of Section A.1.2 is that PBCs are only identifiable in countries/years with
sufficiently large levels of competitiveness and sufficiently low levels of non-economic voting.
5A.2 Tables
Table A.2.1: Country Classification
No Country Year of entering Year of adopting Established Plurality Presidential
the EU the euro democracya ruleb regimec
1 Austria 1995 1999
√
2 Belgium 1952 1999
√
3 Bulgaria 2007
4 Cyprus 2004 2008
√ √
5 Czech Republic 2004
√
6 Denmark 1973
√
7 Estonia 2004
8 Finland 1995 1999
√
9 France 1952 1999
√ √
10 Germany 1952 1999
√ √
11 Greece 1981 2001
√ √
12 Hungary 2004
√
13 Ireland 1973 1999
√
14 Italy 1952 1999
√ √
15 Latvia 2004
16 Lithuania 2004
√ √
17 Luxembourg 1952 1999
√
18 Malta 2004 2008
√
19 Netherlands 1952 1999
√
20 Poland 2004
√
21 Portugal 1986 1999
√
22 Romania 2007
23 Slovakia 2004 2009
24 Slovenia 2004 2007
25 Spain 1986 1999
√ √
26 Sweden 1995
√
27 United Kingdom 1973
√ √
a Refers to a country which has been democratic for more than 20 years. b Refers to a country with a plurality
rule in legislative elections (a country with either a strictly plurality or a mixed plurality-proportional system).
c Refers to a country where the executive is not accountable to the legislature. Source: World Bank’s Database
of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001).
Table A.2.2: Components and Subcomponents of Expenditure and Revenue
Total Expenditure Current Expenditure (1) Final Consumption Expenditure
(2) Social Benefits other than Social Transfers in Kind
(3) Interest
(4) Subsidies
(5) Other Current Expenditure
Capital Expenditure (1) Gross Fixed Capital Formation
(2) Other Capital Expenditure
Total Revenue Current Revenue (1) Taxes
(2) Social Contributions Received
(3) Other Current Revenue
Capital Revenue (1) Capital Transfers Received
The partition of expenditure and revenue into components and subcomponents is based on the European
System of Accounts 1995 (ESA 95). Source: Statistical Annex to European Economy; European Commission.
6Table A.2.3: Variables and Data Sources
Abbreviation Variable Source
NL General government net lending (+) or net borrowing (−) (total general government revenue minus total general government
expenditure excluding interest payable) as a percentage of GDP at market prices.
SAEE
TEXP Total general government expenditure as a percentage of GDP at market prices. SAEE
TREV Total general government revenue as a percentage of GDP at market prices. SAEE
CEXP Current general government expenditure as a percentage of GDP at market prices. SAEE
CREV Current general government revenue as a percentage of GDP at market prices. SAEE
FCE Final consumption expenditure of general government as a percentage of GDP at market prices. Includes the value of goods and
services produced by the government itself (collective consumption) and purchases of goods and services produced by market
producers that are supplied to households as social transfers (individual consumption).
SAEE
TAX Total taxes of general government as a percentage of GDP at market prices. Includes current taxes on income and wealth
(direct taxes) and taxes linked to imports and production (indirect taxes).
SAEE
GROWTH Output growth. Defined as the annual percentage change of real GDP. SAEE
LnGDP Level of development. Constructed using the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita. SAEE
TRADESK Deviation of trade share from its trend value. Constructed using the difference between the natural logarithm of trade share
and its country-specific trend (derived using the Hodrick-Prescott filter).
SAEE
PROP1564 Percentage of population between 15 and 64 years old in the total population. IDB, WDI
PROP65 Percentage of population over the age of 65 in the total population. IDB, WDI
FRAC Fractionalization of government. Measured by the probability that two deputies picked at random among the government
parties will be of different parties.
DPI
EXECRLC Positioning of the government on a left-right scale. Measured by a dummy variable that equals -1 for left governments, 0 for
centrist governments and +1 for right governments.
DPI
LnGLOB The natural logarithm of the KOF index of globalization. The index has three dimensions: economic (described by actual
flows and restrictions), social (described by, for example, international tourism and the number of internet hosts and users) and
political (described by, for example, the number of foreign embassies and membership in international organizations).
Dreher (2006)
LnCONS The natural logarithm of the POLCON index of political constraints. The index measures the number of veto points, their
partisan alignment and the heterogeneity or homogeneity of the preferences within each branch.
Henisz (2000)
BET Proxy for non-economic voting computed as the percentage of respondents who think that their financial situation will improve
over the coming year, rescaled by subtracting the mean across all countries in the same year.
SEB
NEC Proxy for non-economic voting computed as the proportion of responses to survey items associated with non-economic issues,
rescaled by subtracting the mean across all countries in the same year.
SEB
V OT Proxy for competitiveness calculated as the mean monthly difference in the polled vote share between the largest government
party and the largest opposition party, plus the mean monthly change in this difference.
ARGM, RCPO
DV OT Alternative proxy for competitiveness calculated as the value of V OT minus the actual vote share difference between the two
parties in the previous executive election.
ARGM, RCPO
SAEE: Statistical Annex to European Economy, published in Spring 2009; IDB: US Census Bureau International Data Base; WDI: World Bank’s World Development
Indicators; DPI: World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions; SEB: Standard Eurobarometer; ARGM: Angus Reid Global Monitor; RCPO: Market Research Centers &
Polling Organizations
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